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FOREWORD 
J. Amy Dillard* 
Serial may have hit a cultural sweet spot by reaching fans that love 
a mystery, those who are attentive to exonerations gained by 
Innocence Projects, and those who thrive on news from Baltimore's 
criminal justice system. Countless people have confided in me that 
they believed the prosecutor's case failed to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, yet they were troubled that no one could sort out 
who actually killed Rae Min Lee. The search for truth is a trope 
employed in popular mystery novels, where the author usually gives 
her readers an answer by the end. Innocence Projects succeed by 
demonstrating that the convicted prisoner did not do it, and often, if 
DNA is a factor, as a collateral matter, point out who likely did do it. 
Fans of The Wire feel like experts on Baltimore's police department 
and court system, so looking for corruption and mistakes in the 
investigation and trial of Adnan Syed makes for a great party game. 
As a result, every listener wanted closure-a clear indication of 
whether Syed was guilty or innocent, a clear answer on who killed 
Rae Min Lee if Syed did not kill her, and a tidy package of the exact 
mistake in the criminal justice system that could be blamed and 
corrected in the event of a wrongful conviction. But the study of law 
is complex and rarely gives definitive answers. 
We should accept that the criminal justice system is not infallible. 
Where the main issue in controversy is identity of the perpetrator, the 
government often finds itself relying on junk science like fingerprints 
and handwriting exemplars, highly-unreliable eyewitness testimony, 
the specter of motive, and jailhouse and accomplice snitches to 
bolster its case. The "science" at issue in Syed's prosecution 
involved an analysis of cell tower pings to triangulate the location of 
Syed's cell phone, and the bolstering came from Syed's friend, Jay. 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; J.D., 
Washington and Lee University Law School; B.A., Wellesley College. I thank 
Professor Angela Davis for keeping me and others focused on the issue of 
prosecutorial discretion, and I thank all of the prosecutors who are close to my heart -
Joseph Michael and Alejandra Rueda, in particular - for tolerating my pointed 
questions and engaging in conversation about how they exercise their discretion. 
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The motive was the age-old spurned lover story, swirled with racist 
undertones about violent, young Muslim men. And that was enough 
for the jury and the judge who presided over the trial. 
Few people will express an acceptable margin of error in criminal 
convictions, though the common law allows for errors with its "proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. 1 On their first day of law 
school, most of my first-year students can recite William 
Blackstone's ratio that "it is better that ten guilty persons escape than 
one innocent suffer,"2 and all of them express a belief that the ratio is 
a good one. Applying these standards in a way that genuinely 
protects a criminal defendant is much easier when that defendant is 
hypothetical, and while Adnan Syed is a real person, for every 
listener of Serial, he is a hypothetical. Moreover, I hope we can 
appreciate the pressure on jurors to stray from the well-worn 
standards of the presumption of innocence, the defendant's right to 
remain silent, and the government's burden of proof while staring at a 
photo of the decomposing body of a seventeen-year-old girl. Lay 
jurors would need to be superheroes of justice to err on the side of the 
(probably guilty) defendant in the face of the slain innocent. 
Parsing the difference between a wrongful conviction and actual 
innocence is the kind of exercise that makes lay people despise 
lawyers, but the common law does not present us with a binary. The 
government might engage in a prosecution of a guilty man but still 
lack the evidence to sustain its burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt; hence the guilty are found not guilty. And the converse is also 
true-the government might engage in the prosecution of an innocent 
defendant with circumstantial evidence that aligns in a way that 
justifies the jury's inferences to result in a proper conviction. If we 
are more worried about the latter than the former, we must look for 
trends in those proper convictions of innocent defendants and work 
towards addressing the issues. 
1. In my experience, prosecutors routinely explain this standard to jurors by reminding 
them that the burden is not proof beyond all doubt, and standard jury instructions 
from the trial judge will echo this reminder. See MD. CRIM. PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS § 2:02 (2d ed. Supp. 2013) ("However, the State is not required to 
prove guilt beyond all possible doubt or to a mathematical certainty. Nor is the State 
required to negate every conceivable circumstance of innocence. A reasonable doubt 
is a doubt founded upon reason. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires such proof 
as would convince you of the truth of a fact to the extent that you would be willing to 
act upon such belief without reservation in an important matter in your own business 
or personal affairs.") 
2. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *358. 
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Some of these trends are easy to identify, but difficult to discover. 
Police misconduct, such as witness tampering and mishandling 
evidence, systemic failures in state laboratories, and prosecutorial 
misconduct in failing to abide by the rules for disclosing exculpatory 
evidence are familiar corruptions in the criminal justice system, and 
courts, sometimes, offer relief to criminal defendants whose trials 
were overwhelmed with corruption to the detriment of due process. 
Softer failures, like ineffective assistance of counsel, are familiar, 
though once courts and legislatures started to carve out possible relief 
for defendants who may have suffered from ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the tail started to wag the dog. Criminal defense attorneys 
take great pride in their work, but most are quick to point out their 
failings and weaknesses. Falling on the sword for a client who might 
get relief from an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is nearly a 
blood-oath among public defenders. (I like to think that Christina 
Gutierrez, if she were with us, would have filed an affidavit 
confessing and amplifying her sins as Syed's lawyer.) 
In most of my thinking about the flaws in the criminal justice 
system, I come back to wondering how prosecutors and former 
prosecutors reflect on their role and how their reflections might 
change the process for the better. In this era of near-daily 
exonerations, I wonder how they reflect on past prosecutions where 
identity was the element in controversy. With great interest, I read 
Marty Stroud's letter of apology for his role in the prosecution of 
Glenn Ford in 1984 in Louisiana.3 In the letter, he acknowledges that 
he did not break any of the technical rules, but he admits to breaking 
many moral rules. He is especially remorseful about not 
investigating rumors about other suspects, though he had no duty to 
do so. The reflections of Kevin Urrick, the lead prosecutor in the 
Syed trial, feel much more familiar-defend, deflect, advocate for a 
position, and reiterate the circumstantial evidence. I suppose Mr. 
Urrick might take an account of himself and find no flaws in his work 
in the Syed case. But I have legitimate concern whether Vickie 
Wash, the prosecutor who handled Syed's bail hearing, thinks she 
was a good "minister of justice."4 We know she was aware of her 
misrepresentations about violent Muslim men and about the 
3. A.M. "Marty" Stroud, Lead Prosecutor ApologizesJor Role in Sending Man to Death, 
TIMES, http://www.shreveporttimes.comlstory/ opinionlreaders/20 15/03/20/1ead-
prosecutor-offers-apology-in-the-ease-of-exonerated-death-row-inmate-glenn-
fordl250490631 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 emt. (2010). 
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categorical flight-risk of a "Pakistani" teenager because she wrote an 
apology letter to the judge. 
Due process is the protective cloak that should support 
Blackstone's formulation, but only if everyone in the courtroom is 
bound to insure the defendant's due process. While the court 
considers whether Syed's lawyer provided effective representation, 
the system as a whole might be improved by a sustained 
consideration on the role and power of the prosecutor. 
